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TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL PARADIGM 





This article analyses three issues related to the global spread of personal insolvency laws. 
First, it outlines the emergence of an international paradigm on personal insolvency law and 
its central feature of a policy preference for partial repayment alternatives as the norm with 
residual immediate relief reserved for the deserving poor debtor. Second, it examines critically 
this paradigm in the light of existing empirical studies of the extent to which personal 
insolvency law achieves economic and social objectives associated with the fresh start such as 
financial inclusion. The mixed empirical findings on the success of personal insolvency law in 
achieving these objectives, particularly for individuals subject to instability of employment or 
poverty raises further questions about the role of personal insolvency law as a modestly 
progressive safety net for overindebtedness. The final section of the article considers therefore 
recent radical theories of consumer credit in contemporary capitalism which conceptualise 
credit as exploitative and personal insolvency law as a disciplinary and legitimating institution 
which individualises default and may neutralise collective responses to debt and its wider 
causes such as limited public support or provision. The article concludes by outlining how 





Personal insolvency law became more significant after the Great Recession of 2008 when 
international institutions identified household debt as a potential systemic risk for the 
international financial system.1 The subsequent Eurozone crisis accelerated insolvency law 
reforms within the European Union (µEU¶), which proposed a directive on insolvency and 
restructuring law in 2016.2 Emerging economies have also introduced or reformed personal 
                                                     

 LLB (Hons) (Edinburgh University), LLM (McGill University). Professor of Law, University of Kent, 
Canterbury, UK. This article is a revised version of a keynote address at the QUT Faculty of Law, Personal 
Insolvency Conference, 8 September 2016. I am grateful to those who commented on the paper at the conference 
and to Toni Williams and the anonymous reviewers for the QUT Law Review for very useful comments. 
1
 Susan Block-/LHEµ%HVW3UDFWLFHVLQWKH,QVROYHQF\RI1DWXUDO3HUVRQV5DSSRUWHXU¶V6\QRSVLV¶:RUOG%DQN
Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force Meetings, Washington DC, 11 January 2011) [17], citing 
FORVLQJ UHPDUNV RI 9LMD\ 7DWD &KLHI &RXQVHO :RUOG %DQN /(*36 µ« RQH RI WKH OHVVRQV IURP WKH UHFHQW
financial crisis was the recognition of the problem of consumer insolvency as a systemic risk and the consequent 
need for the modernization of domestic laws and institutions to enable jurisdictions to deal effectively and 
efficiently with the risks of individual over-LQGHEWHGQHVV«¶.    
2
 See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Restructuring, 
Insolvency and Discharge Procedures, Directive 2012/30/EU, COM (2016) 723 final, 2016/0359 (COD). For 
Latin America see Consumers International, A Model Law on Family Insolvency for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (2011).  Colombia was the first Latin American country to introduce a personal insolvency law with 
discharge as an important aspect. See General Code of Procedure (Columbia), Law No 1564 of 2012, Title IV 
VVII$UWLFOHRIWKHUHYLVHG81*XLGHOLQHVRQ&RQVXPHU3URWHFWLRQVWDWHVWKDWµ0HPEHUVWDWHVVKRXOG
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insolvency laws.3 It is not an exaggeration to identify D µgloEDO SUROLIHUDWLRQ¶ RI SHUVRQDO
insolvency laws.4 This article explores three questions related to this phenomenon. First, it 
outlines the contours of an emerging international paradigm on personal insolvency law, 
identifying issues which seem to have a transnational salience, such as the promotion of 
entrepreneurialism through a liberal insolvency law discharge. The article finds partial 
repayment alternatives to be the preferred policy instrument in this paradigm, combined with 
residual immediate relief for the deserving poor, sometimes described as No Income No Asset 
Debtors (µNINAs¶). The article highlights both the points of consensus and continuing 
uncertainties in the paradigm, including the scope of its application to both consumers and 
traders. Paradigms are a mixture of scholarly ideas and political interests. The Washington 
consensus is an example.5 This is also true of personal insolvency law. I do not attempt to 
document comprehensively the conjunction of interests and ideas shaping the emerging 
international paradigm; that is the topic of a separate article.  
 
Second, the article examines this paradigm in the light of existing empirical studies of the 
extent to which personal insolvency law achieves objectives associated with the fresh start, 
such as increased entrepreneurialism, and financial and social inclusion.6 These studies 
represent the second wave of personal insolvency law research. The first wave addressed the 
demographics of insolvents, the reasons for individuals choosing insolvency and, particularly 
in the United States (µUS¶), the question of whether individuals were abusing the system.7 I 
suggested in 1997 that research might focus on the longitudinal effects of bankruptcy and the 
fresh start,8 and an increasing number of such studies now exist, primarily in the US, but also 
in Europe, and Australia. Some studies draw attention to the gap between the promise and the 
reality of insolvency relief for at least a significant portion of the bankrupt population.9 These 
studies also question the dominance given to repayment alternatives in the emerging paradigm 
and raise questions about the role of personal insolvency law in addressing issues faced by 
NINA debtors. Responses to these findings might include measures to make the fresh start 
more effective through the reduction of existing disabilities and barriers facing bankrupts,10 
                                                     
ensure that collective resolution procedures are expeditious, transparent, fair, inexpensive and accessible to both 
consumers and businesses, including those pertaining to over-LQGHEWHGQHVVDQGEDQNUXSWF\FDVHV¶ 
3
 For example, India (2016), Russia (2015). China may introduce a personal insolvency law within this decade. 
4
 See Frank Trentmann, Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, from the Fifteenth Century 
to the Twenty First $OOHQ/DQHµ7KHJOREDOSUROLIHUDWLRQRIEDQNUXSWF\ODZVILQDOO\LVDUHFRJQLWLRQ
WKDWRYHULQGHEWHGQHVVLVDSUREOHPLQDOODIIOXHQWVRFLHWLHVLQFOXGLQJVRFLDOPDUNHWDQGZHOIDUHVWDWHV¶ 
5
 6DUDK%DEEµ7KH:DVKLQJWRQ&RQVHQVXVDV7UDQVQDWional Policy Paradigm: Its Origins, Trajectory and Likely 
6XFFHVVRU¶Review of International Political Economy 268. 
6
 -RVH0*DUULGRµ7KH5ROHRI3HUVRQDO,QVROYHQF\/DZLQ(FRQRPLF'HYHORSPHQW$Q,QWURGXFWLRQWRWKH:RUOG
Bank Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons¶The World Bank Legal Review 111 
(referring to the suicide of farmers in India and social conflict in Hungary over problematic mortgage loans). 
7
 The classic US studies from this period are: Teresa A Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Westbrook, As We Forgive 
Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America  (Oxford University Press, 1989); Teresa Sullivan, 
Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt (Yale University Press, 
2000). 
8
 ,DLQ5DPVD\µ0RGHOVRI&RQVXPHU%DQNUXSWF\,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU5HVHDUFKDQG3ROLF\¶ Journal of 
Consumer Policy 6HHDOVR-D\:HVWEURRNµ(PSLULFDO5HVHDUFKLQ&RQVXPHU%DQNUXSWF\¶±02) 
80 Texas Law Review 2123, 2147: µ:HNQRZYHU\OLWWOHDERXWFRQVXPHUEDQNUXSWVDIWHUWKH\OHDYHWKHEDQNUXSWF\
FRXUW H[FHSW WKDW WKH\ UDUHO\ ILOH DJDLQ « :H NQRZ OLWWOH DERXW WKH ILQDQFLDO VLWXDWLRQ RI GHEWRUV DIWHU
EDQNUXSWF\«WKH JDSLQJ KROHV LQ RXU NQRZOHGJH PDNH LW KDUG WR HYDOXDWH how successful bankruptcy is in 
SURYLGLQJDIUHVKVWDUW¶-HDQ%UDXFKHUµ&RQVXPHU%DQNUXSWF\DV3DUWRIWKH6RFLDO6DIHW\1HW)UHVK6WDUWRU
7UHDGPLOO"¶Santa Clara Law Review 1065, 1090. 
9
 See below, Part III. 
10
 US writers argue for simplification of the process to reduce costs and increase access. See eg Ronald J Mann, 
µ0DNLQJ6HQVHRI1DWLRQ-OHYHO%DQNUXSWF\)LOLQJ5DWHV¶LQ-RKDQQD1LHPL,DLQ5DPVD\DQG:LOOLDP&:KLWIRUG
(eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy: Comparative and International Perspectives (Hart, 2009) 243; 
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more careful screening of those wishing to file for insolvency, or better social and economic 
policies to address directly the problems associated with insolvency such as job insecurity or 
limited health coverage.11 Bankruptcy research functions in this last case DVWKHµFDQDU\LQWKH
PLQH¶LGHQWLI\LQJZLGHUSUREOHPVLQVRFLHW\12 
 
The gap identified between the promise and realit\RIWKHµIUHVKVWDUW¶leads to my final topic, 
reflection on the role of personal insolvency in contemporary capitalism. A conventional view 
is that the fresh start in bankruptcy is a modestly progressive safety net for addressing over-
indebtedness. Certainly, this assumption underlies the emerging paradigm and much 
contemporary research on personal insolvency law. Since the Great Recession, theoretical 
writing on the role of credit and debt in capitalism has mushroomed.13 A few writers14 have 
reconceptualised bankruptcy as a disciplinary and legitimating device in a contemporary 
capitalism defined by debt. Bankruptcy law mediates the contradictions between the 
imperatives of a contemporary capitalism defined by credit-led accumulation and the inevitable 
problems of non-repayment for certain groups in society.15 This perspective challenges the 
progressive assumptions about insolvency law, and I examine briefly the significance of this 
perspective for future research on personal insolvency.  
 
II AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL PARADIGM?16 
 
A policy paradigm represents a framework of ideas on the goals of a policy, the instruments 
that can be used to attain the goals and the nature of the problem at issue.17 In the area of 
corporate insolvency law,18 an international paradigm19 has emerged since the Asian financial 
crisis of the late 1990s, when a modified Anglo-$PHULFDQ µUHVFXH FXOWXUH¶ ZDV
                                                     
5RQDOG0DQQDQG.DWKHULQH3RUWHUµ6DYLQJ8SIRU%DQNUXSWF\¶Georgetown Law Journal 289, 336: 
µWKHILOLQJSDWWHUQVVXJJHVWDJURXSRIGHEWRUVIRUZKRPWKHGHFLVLRQWRILOHEDQNUXSWF\LVGHIHUUHGE\DODFNRI
fundV¶6HHDOVRWKHVXJJHVWLRQVLQ1LFROD+RZHOODQG5RVDOLQG0DVRQµ5HLQIRUFLQJ6WLJPDRU'HOLYHULQJD)UHVK
6WDUW %DQNUXSWF\ DQG )XWXUH (QJDJHPHQW LQ WKH :RUNIRUFH¶   University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 1529. 
11
 6HHHJ-DFRE6+DFNHUµ7KH0LGGOH&ODVVDW5LVN¶LQ.DWKHULQH3RUWHUHGBroke: How Debt Bankrupts the 
Middle Class (Stanford University Press, 2012). 
12
 Westbrook, above n 8, 2125. 
13
 Literature here includes: Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso, 
2014); Adair Turner, Between Debt and the Devil: Money, Credit and Fixing Global Finance (Princeton 
University Press, 2016); David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Melville House, 2011); Greta R Krippner, 
Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Harvard University Press, 2011); Susanne 
Soederberg, Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry: Money Discipline and the Surplus Population (Routledge, 
2014). 
14
 See below, Part IV. 
15
 See Soederberg, above n 13, and discussion below in Part IV. 
16
 Some of the material in this section draws on chapter 6 of Iain Ramsay, Personal Insolvency In the 21st Century: 
A Comparison of the US and Europe (Bloomsbury, 2017). 
17
 6HHWKHFODVVLFDUWLFOHE\3HWHU$+DOOµ3ROLF\3DUDGLJPV6RFLDO/HDUQLQJDQGWKH6WDWH7KH&DVHRI(FRQRPLF
3ROLF\PDNLQJ LQ %ULWDLQ¶   Comparative Politics 275, 279. A more ambitious concept is that of a 
WUDQVQDWLRQDOOHJDORUGHUµWKHWUDQVQational production of legal norms and institutional forms in particular fields 
and their migration across borders regardless of whether they address transnational activities or purely national 
RQHV¶*UHJRU\6KDIIHUHGTransnational Legal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
6.  
18
 See Terence Halliday and Bruce G Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crisis 
(Stanford University Press, 2010); Susan Block-/LHE µ6HWWOLQJ DQG &RQFRUGDQFH 7ZR &DVHV LQ *OREDO
CoPPHUFLDO/DZ¶LQ6KDIIHUDERYHQ 
19
 Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer (eds) Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 
µWUDQVQDWLRQDOOHJDORUGHU¶GHILQHGDVµDFROOHFWLRQRIIRUPDOL]HGOHJDOQRUPVDQGDVVRFLDWHGRUJDQL]DWLRQV and 
DFWRUVWKDWDXWKRULWDWLYHO\RUGHUWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGSUDFWLFHRIODZDFURVVQDWLRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQV¶ 
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internationalised as part of the international financial architecture of economic development. 
This order is embedded in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
µUNCITRAL¶ legislative guide on insolvency, providing EHVWSUDFWLFHVIRUDVVHVVLQJDVWDWH¶V
insolvency law, and functioning as part of structural adjustment programmes under loan 
conditionality. In contrast, personal insolvency was viewed historically as not significant 
internationally in terms of the international financial architecture. Along with the topic of over-
indebtedness it raised social, cultural and political issues which were best left to individual 
states.20 Until the 1990s, many industrialised nations had no ² or limited ² personal 
insolvency systems which provided a discharge of debts. Where discharge was available it was 
usually limited to traders.21 However, developments in Europe and elsewhere since the 
recession of the early 1990s and the subsequent Great Recession of 2008 suggest the contours 
of an emerging paradigm of personal insolvency.  
 
A policy paradigm assumes agreement on the nature of the problem at issue. The immediate 
problem addressed by personal insolvency is that of over-indebtedness, but disagreement has 
existed as to whether factors such as unemployment or individual behaviour through 
overspending are the primary causes of over-indebtedness.22 The EU Commission identifies 
over-indebtedness mostly with unemployment, divorce and illness,23 while a recent Bank of 
France study indicates D µFRQMXQFWXUH RI HYHQWV¶ DV WKH primary reason (see Table 1). The 
Insolvency Service in England and Wales identifies both exogenous and individual causes for 
insolvency (Table 2). These official statistics on reasons for bankruptcy are important 
politically because they suggest the nature of a policy response, contribute to ongoing political 
debates, and shape dominant narratives about the nature of failure. However, the limits of the 
categorisations in these data and their partial construction of the social reality of over-
indebtedness mean that they should be treated with caution.24  
 
Table 1: France: Principal Causes of Over-Indebtedness 2014  
Unemployment or degradation of 
employment 
23 
Budget Constrained  17 
Routine use of credit 14 
Conjuncture of events  41 
Intergenerational assistance 5 
Source: Bank of France, Study of Paths Leading to Overindebtedness (2016). 
  
                                                     
20
  6HH HJ 'RQQD 0F.HQ]LH 6NHQH DQG $GULDQ :DOWHUV µ&RQVXPLQJ 3DVVLRQV %HQFKPDUNLQJ &RQVXPHU
%DQNUXSWF\/DZ6\VWHPV¶ LQ3DXO2PDU HG International Insolvency Law $VKJDWH µKDUGO\DQ\




WKH ZRUOG ZRXOG QRW KDYH EHHQ SRVVLEOH 0RVW FRXQWULHV GLG QRW KDYH D FRQVXPHU EDQNUXSWF\ V\VWHP¶
µ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQ-RKDQQD1LHPL,DLQ5DPVD\DQG William C Whitford (eds) Consumer Bankruptcy in Global 
Perspective (Hart, 2003) 1. 
22
 Resulting in significant differences between systems for example in relation to access criteria, institutional 
frameworks, time to discharge and discharge exceptions. 
23
 European Commission, above n 2, 4. 
24
 I discuss the limits of statistics on reasons for bankruptcy and the various research studies on causes of personal 
insolvency further in Ramsay, above n 16, 16±24. 
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Table 2: England and Wales: Bankruptcies by Cause of Insolvency as Recorded by the Official 
Receiver 2015. 
 
Source: Insolvency Service, Bankruptcies by age gender and cause of insolvency 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individual-insolvencies-by-location-age-and-gender-
england-and-wales-!,QFDVHVWKHFDXVHZDVUHFRUGHGDVµXQNQRZQQRQ-VXUUHQGHU¶7KHVH
cases are not included in the Table.  
 
 
After the Great Recession, writers linked individual debt problems to macroeconomic issues.25 
The policy problem now was that significant numbers of over-indebted individuals created a 
debt overhang and acted as a drag on economic growth. One response was therefore the 
provision of access to a swift deleveraging of debt. This swift deleveraging narrative was, as I 
will argue in the next section, initially adopted by the International Monetary Fund (µIMF¶), 
but ran into headwinds in its application within the EU. This debate over the nature of the 
problem of individual failure to repay suggests that laws will continue attempting to balance 
debt relief with provisions intended to address moral hazard and individual behaviour. 
 
The goals of individual insolvency policy are encapsulated in the idea of the fresh start but the 
concept of the fresh start is ambiguous, even in a country sometimes regarded as its source, the 
US. A fresh start may simply mean being free from the burden of existing debt, but might also 
include ideas of financial and social reintegration.26 Promoting entrepreneurialism through a 
swift fresh start has become an influential idea. Several European states, such as Germany and 
the Netherlands, promoted social reintegration through the use of independent debt counselling 
agencies as the primary intermediaries. Individual counselling provided a substitute for 
rollbacks in welfare provision.27 Although counselling could be justified in terms of an 
enabling welfare state which would help individuals to participate again in the labour market 
rather than receive cash transfers, the limited funding for counselling and patchy national 
                                                     
25
 See Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, House of Debt: How They (and You) Caused the Great Recession, and How We 
Can Prevent it from Happening Again (University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
26
 6HHHJGLVFXVVLRQLQ0DUJDUHW+RZDUGµ$7KHRU\RI'LVFKDUJHLQ&RQVXPHU%DQNUXSWF\¶Ohio State 
Law Journal ZKHUH+RZDUGFRQFOXGHGWKDWµGLVFKDUJHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIQRQ-tort claims should have 
only one goal ² to restore the debtor to economic productivity and viable participation in the open credit 
economy. This standard calls for making discharge broadly available, since viable economic participation is 




37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 409, 411. 
 Non-Trading Cases 
(n=11095) (%) 
All Cases  
(n=14905) (%) 
Business related failure -- 25 
Living Beyond Means 19 14 
Relationship breakdown 16 12 
Loss of employment 12 9 
Illness/accident 11 8 
Reduction in household income or significant 
UHGXFWLRQLQEDQNUXSW¶VLQFRPH 
24 18 
Speculation 1 1 
Other 17 13 
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coverage, as in Sweden, undercut its potential effectiveness.28 In contrast, the US and Canada 
now mandate financial counselling for bankrupts, based partly on a perception that individual 
financial mismanagement leads to insolvency, as well as the political influence of financial 
institutions. The EU Directive highlights the economic benefits for investment, lending and 
promoting consumer demand through a swift discharge.29 It focuses on the economic rather 
than social benefits of the fresh start. 
 
Repayment plans with residual immediate relief for the deserving poor represent the preferred 
instruments for achieving the fresh start while addressing concerns about moral hazard. This 
represents the most solid aspect of the paradigm. We noted this trend in 2009.30 It is certainly 
the continental European model. The development of debt adjustment systems in Europe, often 
introduced by conservative governments in the 1990s represented an adjustment to a more 
neoliberal model of the role of the market and social provision.31 European studies and soft law 
initiatives during this period outlined an optimal policy for personal insolvency, partly inspired 
by Chapter 13 of the US Bankruptcy Code.32 It included the idea of a moratorium or stay, a 
realistic payment plan, usually no more than four years subject to majority approval by 
creditors, adequate exemptions determined by member states, professional debt counsellors 
acting as advisers and administrators, financing partly by creditor levies, with immediate 
discharge for the hopelessly indebted. By 2009, Jason Kilborn argued that European 
poOLF\PDNHUV ZHUH FRQYHUJLQJ RQ D µXQLWDU\ SDUDGLJP RI FRQVXPHU LQVROYHQF\ WUHDWPHQW¶
involving less demanding repayment plans and greater possibilities for the residual discharge 
of debts.33 These developments reflect partly a social learning process concerning the fact that 
many individuals had little payment capacity, and partly state concerns about the public costs 
of processing debtors. For example, the introduction of the English NINA procedure was 
driven by a desire to minimise court and government processing costs.  
 
A significant ambiguity in the scope of the paradigm concerns its application to both individual 
consumers and traders, and whether traders should have a swifter period of discharge than 
consumers. The promotion of entrepreneurialism through a liberal discharge procedure is an 
                                                     
28
 This was the conclusion of the Hedborg Report in 2013 in Sweden SOU 2013 Out of the Debt Trap. I discuss 
this at greater length in Ramsay above n 16, ch 5. 
29
 µ6Korter discharge periods have a positive impact on both consumers and investors, as they are quicker to re-
HQWHUWKHF\FOHVRIFRQVXPSWLRQDQGLQYHVWPHQW7KLVERRVWVHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS¶(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDERYHQ
2, 4. The social aspects of insolvency have less salience in the Directive. The EU Economic and Social Committee 
KDG UHFRPPHQGHG IRU FRQVXPHUV LQ  µD IUHH SURFHGXUH D PRUDWRULXP RQ FODLPV DELOLW\ WR NHHS PDLQ
residence and the possibility of cancelling debts in most extreme situation. The goal is to find a solution that will 
HQDEOHKRXVHKROGVWRDYRLGVRFLDOH[FOXVLRQDQGZKHUHSRVVLEOHWRSD\RIIWKHLUGHEWVDVIDUDVWKHLUPHDQVDOORZ¶
VHH µ2SLQLRQ RI WKH (XURSHDQ (FRQRPLF DQG 6RFLDO &RPPLWWHH RQ &RQVXPHU 3URWHFWLRQ DQG $SSURSULDWH
Treatment of Over-LQGHEWHGQHVVWR3UHYHQW6RFLDO([FOXVLRQ¶([SORUDWRU\2SLQLRQ,175DSSRUWHXU-general 
Reine Claude Mader (2014). 
30
 See Niemi, Ramsay and Whitford, above n 10,  µ7RGD\PRVWFRXQWULHV VSRQVRUUHSD\PHQWSODQVZLWKRU
without a discharge option upon conclusion, and even common law countries that traditionally have emphasized 
QHDUO\XQFRQGLWLRQDODFFHVVWRDGLVFKDUJHSURFHGXUHLQFUHDVLQJO\HPSKDVL]HUHSD\PHQWSODQVDVDQDOWHUQDWLYH¶ 
31
 6HH-RKDQQD1LHPLµ&RQVXPHU%DQNUXSWF\0DUNHW)DLOXUH or Social Problem? (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 473, 502. 
32
 6HH1LFN+XOVµ7RZDUGVD(XURSHDQ$SSURDFKWR2YHULQGHEWHGQHVVIRU&RQVXPHUVLQWKH(&0HPEHU6WDWHV
)DFWV DQG 6HDUFK IRU D 6ROXWLRQ¶   Journal of Consumer Policy 216; Udo Reifner et al, Consumer 
Overindebtedness and Consumer Law in the European Union: Final Report (Commission of the European 
&RPPXQLWLHV+XOVQRWHGDWWKDWµRXUPRGHOLVFRQVWUXFWHGDVDFRPELQDWLRQRIWKRVHHOHPHQWVRI
European solutions that are promLVLQJDQGVRPHHOHPHQWVIURPWKH$PHULFDQEDQNUXSWF\FRGH¶ He noted in 1993 
that over-indebtedness was primarily viewed as an issue in Northern European states but not in Italy, Greece, or 
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integral aspect of the emerging international paradigm. The EU Directive of 2016 proposes a 
maximum three-year discharge period for the honest entrepreneur as part of wider policies to 
enhance entrepreneurialism in the EU, with the possibility of applying this period to 
consumers.34 In Britain, the new Labour government at the beginning of the century embraced 
entrepreneurialism in the 2002 liberalisation of the English discharge procedure.35 The 
shortening of the discharge period in Germany from six to three years in 2014 for individuals 
able to pay a portion of their debts is also intended to promote entrepreneurialism.36 Some 
European countries have recently introduced special provisions to make it easier for 
entrepreneurs to fail (Sweden, France, Spain). Australia recommends liberalisation of the 
discharge process to promote entrepreneurialism.37  
 
Consumers, the self-employed and small businesses represent overlapping categories of 
debtors. Many self-employed individuals use personal credit cards to finance their business 
and mortgage the family home to support a business. In the µJig economy¶, with workers no 
longer employed in traditional 9±5 jobs,38 the self-employed are little different from 
employees. Moreover, consumers are, like businesses, encouraged to be responsible risk takers, 
investing in education or training, and managing their financial future in an increasingly 
financialised culture.39 7KHFRQFHSWRIWKHLQGLYLGXDODVDQµHQWUHSUHQHXURIWKHVHOI¶PDQaging 
RQH¶VKXPDQFDSLWDOHURGHVGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHHQWUHSUHQHXUDQGWKHFRQVXPHU40  
 
A International Institutions and the Emerging Paradigm 
 
International institutions have contributed to the development of the contemporary paradigm 
since the Great Recession. The IMF promoted in some documents the importance of a swift 
deleveraging of household debt in the wake of the crisis, arguing that such measures would 
benefit primarily those with a higher propensity to consume (average to lower income 
consumers) and thus drive a recovery.41 +RZHYHUWKLVµVZLIWGHOHYHUDJLQJ¶DSSURDFKUHFHLYHG
more muted support in the actual work of the IMF in Europe after the Eurozone crisis, 
suggesting political resistance by states and other actors such as the European Central Bank. 
An IMF working paper in 2013 argued from cross-country experience that reforms should 
                                                     
34
 European Commission, above n 2, art 20; and see Recital 15 where the Commission notes that consumer over-
LQGHEWHGQHVVLVDPDWWHURIµJUHDWHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOFRQFHUQ¶ 
35
 The Insolvency Service Annual Report 2014±VWDWHVDWWKHRXWVHWWKDWµ(QWUHSUHQHXULDOLVPDQGDGULYHIRU
business growth will be accompanied by financial failures as well as sucFHVVHV¶ 
36
 )UDQN)RVVHQTXRWHVWKH*HUPDQ0LQLVWHURI-XVWLFHVWDWLQJWKDWWKHµUHIRUPRILQVROYHQF\ODZLVRQHRIWKH
PRVW LPSRUWDQW SURMHFWV LQ EXVLQHVV ODZ¶ DQG WKDW µWKRVH ZKR H[KLELW WKH HQWUHSUHQHXULDO VSLULW GHVHUYH OHJDO
protection that encourages them in their decision to depart into self-HPSOR\PHQW¶)UDQN0)RVVHQ µ3HUVRQDO
Bankruptcy Law, Wealth, and Entrepreneurship ² (YLGHQFH IURP WKH ,QWURGXFWLRQRID³)UHVK6WDUW´3ROLF\¶
(2014) 16 American Law and Economics Review 269, 274. 
37
 See Productivity CommisVLRQµ,VVXHVLQ3HUVRQDO,QVROYHQF\¶Business Set-up, Transfer and Closure: 
Inquiry Report (No 75, 2015): recommendation 12.1, for a one-year discharge period. Individuals with excess 
income would be required to make payments for three years (see at 343). 
38
 Matthew Taylor, Good Work, the Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices (Department of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (UK), 2017) < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/good-work-the-
taylor-review-of-modern-working-practices >.  
39
 6HH1HLO)OLJVWHLQDQG$GDP*ROGVWHLQµ7KH(PHUJHQFHRID)LQDQFH&XOWXUHLQ$PHULFDQ+RXVHKROGV±
¶Socio-Economic Review 1.  
40
 But media discourse may still reflect the distinction between entrepreneurs and consumers describing how the 




 See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (2012), and other documents discussed in Ramsay, 
above n 16, 159. 
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SURYLGHDIUHVKVWDUWIRUµILQDQFLDOO\UHVSRQVLEOH¶LQGLYLGXDOV, typically after three to five years. 
It also proposed a swift µQRLQFRPHQRDVVHWSURFHGXUH¶IRUWKRVHZLWKQRUHSD\ment capacity.42 
This latter procedure recognises the limits of existing European repayment systems where 
significant numbers of individuals have no repayment capacity and may be unable to pay for 
accessing the insolvency system in those countries which impose a fee.43 The idea of a special 
NINA procedure originated in New Zealand and was implemented in England and Wales in 
2009. Writers appeal to this idea as a model for US bankruptcy simplification.44 The English 
model is a means-tested administrative procedure involving an online application to the 
Insolvency Service through a limited number of primarily publicly subsidised45 µDSSURYHG
LQWHUPHGLDULHV¶,46 who act as screening agencies checking the eligibility of the debtor.47 The 
order can be used every six years. A debtor must inform the Insolvency Service of any change 
in her or his financial status (for example, increase in income) during the one-year period.48 
The use of the term µDebt Relief¶ rather than bankruptcy is intended to avoid the stigma of 
bankruptcy, which might deter some applicants.49 The objectives of the procedure are to 




International Monetary Fund, Spain: 2013 Article IV Consultation: Selected Issues (IMF Country Report, No 
13/245, 2013) 25. The IMF persuaded Cyprus to adopt a law which includes: a three-year discharge for 
bankruptcy; the possibility of a restructuring plan in relation to secured and unsecured debts subject to approval 
of 75 per cent in value of creditors; a no income no asset programme with discharge after one year for individuals 
ZLWKGHEWVXQGHU¼6HHDOVR*UHHFHMemorandum of Understanding between EU and Greece (2015) 18±
19, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/pdf/01_mou_20150811_en.pdf>. 
India has adopted a no-asset procedure in its recent reform. See the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 Part 
,,,&KDSWHULQWURGXFLQJDµIUHVKVWDUWSURFHVV¶IRUdebtors with limited income, assets and debts. The debtor is 
discharged after six months (s 92). 
43
 See in Canada: Stephanie Ben-,VKDLDQG6DXO6FKZDUW]µ%DQNUXSWF\IRUWKH3RRU"¶Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 471. 
44
 6HH HJ 5RQDOG - 0DQQ µ0DNLQJ 6HQVH RI 1DWLRQ-/HYHO %DQNUXSWF\ )LOLQJ 5DWHV¶ LQ 1LHPL 5DPVD\ DQG
Whitford above n 10 243±4; Elizabeth Warren et al, The Law of Debtors and Creditors: Text, Cases and Problems 
(Wolters, Kluwer, 7th ed, 2014) 320. But see AngHOD . /LWWZLQ µ7KH$IIRUGDELOLW\3DUDGR[+RZ&RQVXPHU
%DQNUXSWF\¶V*UHDWHVW:HDNQHVV0D\$FFRXQW IRU ,WV6XUSULVLQJ6XFFHVV¶  William and Mary Law 
Review 6HHDOVR+HUPLH&RHW]HHDQG0HODQLH5RVWRIIµ&RQVXPHU'HEW5HOLHILQ6RXWK$IULFD² Should 
WKH ,QVROYHQF\ 6\VWHP 3URYLGH IRU 1,1$ 'HEWRUV" /HVVRQV IURP 1HZ =HDODQG¶   International 
Insolvency Review 188. 
45
 &LWL]HQV$GYLFHDUHJLVWHUHGFKDULW\LVWKHPDMRULQWHUPHGLDU\&LWL]HQV$GYLFHDLPVµWRSURYLGHWKHDGYLFH
people need for WKHSUREOHPV WKH\ IDFH¶DQG LPSURYH WKHSROLFLHVDQGSULQFLSOHV WKDWDIIHFWSHRSOH¶V OLYHV¶ D
UHVHDUFK DQG FDPSDLJQV DJHQGD NQRZQ DV µVRFLDO SROLF\¶ KWWSVZZZFLWL]HQVDGYLFHRUJXNDERXW-us/>. It 
receives the majority of its funding from central government and each local bureau may also receive funds from 
institutions such as the National Lottery. A central office provides expertise, but it relies heavily on volunteers in 
ORFDOEXUHDX[,WVZHEVLWHLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKHUHDUHµLQGLYLGXDOFKDULWLHV«2I the 28 500 people who work for 
WKHVHUYLFHRYHURIWKHPDUHYROXQWHHUVDQGQHDUO\DUHSDLGVWDII¶ 
46
 See Debt Relief Orders (Designation of Competent Authorities) Regulations 2009, reg 3(2)(b)(i). 
47
 Access is limited to individuals with non-exempt assets below £1000, a vehicle valued at less than £1000, 
unsecured debts less than £20 000, and no more than £50 in surplus income, based on a formula tracking 
reasonable expenditures of individuals in the bottom income quintile. Data indicate that about 1 per cent of 
applications are rejected by the Insolvency Service with further information requested in about 5 per cent of cases. 
Individuals must pay for the service (£90) with £10 going to the approved intermediary. Access is barred to 
individuals who have entered into a transaction at an undervalue or given a preference within the previous two 
years, and debtor behaviour can be sanctioned through a DRO restriction order. A restriction order may be made 
either through the court, or an undertaking by the debtor to the Insolvency Service. A broad discretion exists to 
make such an order where it is appropriately VWUXFWXUHGE\DOLVWRIIDFWRUVVXFKDVµLQFXUULQJEHIRUHWKHGDWHRI
the determination of the application for the [DRO], a debt which the debtor had no reasonable expectation of 
EHLQJDEOHWRSD\¶VHHInsolvency Act 1986, sch 4ZB(2)(h). 
48
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 251J(5). 
49
 This description was proposed in a 2004 research paper on administration orders where the authors noted that 
µVRPHRIWKHpeople we interviewed were very resistant to the idea of bankruptcy, and were deterred by the stigma 
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provide debt relief for those who are unable to pay the costs of accessing bankruptcy 
(approximately £700) and to prevent financial exclusion.50  
 
In 2013, the World Bank, after recognising the international significance of consumer 
insolvency in 2011,51 published a Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural 
Persons.52 This document did not outline best practices,53 but recognised the dominance 
internationally of payment plans as a condition of relief.54 It was implicitly critical of long 
repayment plans imposed on individuals with no repayment capacity as in Germany (six years) 
and Sweden (five years). $OWKRXJKLQGLYLGXDOVPD\EHJLYHQDµ]HURUHSD\PHQWSODQ¶LQWKHVH
jurisdictions, they are not discharged until the end of the plan. The World Bank report, like the 
IMF, also highlighted the problem of the NINA debtor, the individual with no assets or 
repayment capacity or resources to pay for insolvency. German studies suggest that 80 per cent 
of debtors on plans are nullinsolvenz, that is, they have no capacity to make repayments over 
the six-year waiting period.55 In Sweden, approximately 40 per cent of debtors on the five-year 
restructuring plans have no repayment capacity.56 Figure 1 shows the rise in France of 
rétablissement personnel, providing an immediate discharge to individuals with no likelihood 
of repaying their debts. The World Bank Report also recognised the issue of moral hazard in a 
bankruptcy system, but concluded that there was a danger that focus on this issue could 
                                                     
WKH\ ZRXOG IDFHJLYHQ WKH UHODWLYHO\ VPDOO VXPVRI PRQH\ WKH\RZHG« $ VLPSOLILHG GHEW SURFHGXUH ZRXOG
therefore seem more appropriate for people on very low incomes that are unlikely to increase. This could be called 
something other than bankruptcy, to overcome the stigma that people feel, and differentiate it from the full 
EDQNUXSWF\SURFHGXUH¶(ODLQH.HPSVRQDQG6KDURQ&ROODUGµ0DQDJLQJ0XOWLSOH'HEWV(xperiences of County 
&RXUW$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ2UGHUVDPRQJ'HEWRUV&UHGLWRUVDQG$GYLVRUV¶'&$5HVHDUFK6HULHV'HSDUWPHQW
for Constitutional Affairs (UK), July 2004). 
50
 µ3DUW>RIWKHTribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007] introduces a package of targeted measures that 
improve and extend the range of solutions available to assist debtors with relatively low income and debts. Those 
solutions seek to promote financial inclusion and are targeted, in particular, at those who are disproportionately 
affeFWHG E\ GHEW DQG DUH JHQHUDOO\ OHDVW DEOH WR GHDO ZLWK D UDQJH RI FUHGLWRU GHPDQGV¶ 8QLWHG .LQJGRP
Parliamentary Debates+RXVHRI/RUGV1RYHPEHU+/9ROFROµ'52VZHUHLQWURGXFHGLQ
April 2009 following research that identified that there were people in long-term debt difficulties who had nothing 
to offer their creditors and who could not afford to make themselves bankrupt. Delivered in partnership with the 
professional debt advice sector, DROs provide low-cost easy access to debt relief for those overwhelmed by 
relatively low levels of unmanageable debt. They are designed to provide a fresh start for the most vulnerable 
SHRSOHWUDSSHGLQGHEW¶8QLWHG.LQJGRPParliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9 November 2010, c7-
8WS (Edward DaYH\/DG\-XVWLFH+DOHKDVGHVFULEHGWKHSURFHGXUHDVµDQHZDQGVLPSOLILHGZD\RIZLSLQJWKH
VODWHFOHDQIRUGHEWRUVZKRDUHWRRSRRUWRJREDQNUXSW¶Secretary of State v Payne [2011] UKSC 60, 63.  
51
 See, Block-/LHEDERYHQ>@µ>5@HFHQWHYHQWVVXJJHVWWKDWWKHH[SDQVLRQRIDFFHVVWRILQDQFHWKHH[WHQVLRQ
of modern modes of financial intermediation, and the mobility and globalization of financial flows may have 
changed the character and scale of WKHULVNRIFRQVXPHULQVROYHQF\LQVLPLODUZD\VLQPDQ\GLIIHUHQWHFRQRPLHV¶ 
52
 See, World Bank, Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons (2013). This was the work of 
a small group of academics, (the author was a member of the drafting committee, chaired by Jason Kilborn), 
within the context of a World Bank Task Force comprised of lawyers, government representatives, academics, 
judges (primarily US bankruptcy judges), and representatives of UNCITRAL.  
53
 The reasons were the potential diversity of cultural, and social issues associated with personal insolvency. 
World Bank above n 52, [12]. While these reasons have some weight, the approach taken by the Report was also 
driven by political factors. The Bank wished to publish a report quickly, and any attempt to state best practices 
might result in the project being taken over by UNCITRAL. See discussion in Ramsay, above n 16, ch 6. 
54
 World Bank, above n 52, 134. 
55
 Information provided by Jan Heuer citing 2015 statistics on over-indebtedness where 46 per cent of debtors are  
unemployed, 37 per cent without formal job qualifications, 38 per cent with debts below 10 000, 29 per cent with 
GHEWVEHWZHHQDQGSHUFHQWZLWKLQFRPHVEHORZHXURDPRQWK-DQ+HXHUµ7KH1HZ3RRU
PeUVRQ¶V%DQNUXSWF\,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH'LPHQVLRQV¶:RUNVKRSSUHVHQWDWLRQ8QLYHUVLW\RI.HQW
28 April 2016) on file with author. 
56
 See Ramsay, above n 16, ch 5. 
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overshadow the many benefits of debt relief, and existing evidence did not suggest moral 
hazard was a significant problem.57 
 
Figure 1: France: The rise of rétablissement personnel 2004±2015 
 
 
Source: Bank of France: Annual Overindebtedness Statistics 
 
 
B Are Anglo-Saxon Systems Different? 
  
It might be argued that Anglo-Saxon systems do not fit the paradigm of a preference for 
repayment plans, given the historic role of straight bankruptcy providing a bankruptcy 
discharge without the necessity of an income repayment order. Moreover, individuals in Anglo 
systems may choose their insolvency solution, whereas states such as Germany impose a 
standard solution on debtors. These differences might suggest the persistence of legal origins 
in creating difference.58 However, common law systems have witnessed the rise of formal 
repayment alternatives, for example the Individual Voluntary Arrangement (µIVA¶) in England 
and Wales (Figure 2) promoted by entrepreneurial debt intermediaries, the consumer proposal 
in Canada (see Figure 3),59 or the debt settlement arrangement in Australia (Figure 4).  
 
 
                                                     
57
 World Bank, above n 52, [113]±[119]. 
58
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-SilaneV DQG $QGUHL 6KOHLIHU µ7KH (FRQRPLF &RQVHTXHQFHV RI /HJDO
2ULJLQV¶Journal of Economic Literature 285. 
59
 The increase in Canada is partly a function of the increase in 2009 of total unsecured debt permitted in a proposal 
from CAN$75 000 to $250 000. Evidence also exists of increased steering by intermediaries towards debt 
repayment rather than straight bankruptcy. See Office of Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, Review of 
Licensed Insolvency Trustee Business Practices in Relation to Administration of Consumer Insolvencies (2017) 
<https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br03754.html>. See the comparative discussion of repayment 
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Figure 2: England and Wales Bankruptcy, IVAs, Debt Relief Orders, 1979±2015 (Administration 
Orders 1979±2011) 
 
Source: Insolvency Service England and Wales, Annual Insolvency Statistics  
 
Figure 3: Canada Bankruptcies and Proposals per 1000 Capita 1992±2016 
 
Source: Office of Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Canada. Note that the ceiling for debt in consumer 
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Figure 4: Australia, Debt Arrangements and Bankruptcy 2002±2016 
 
Source: Australian Financial Security Authority, Annual Personal Insolvency Statistics 
 
 
7KH8.&DQDGDDQG$XVWUDOLDKDYHDOVR LQWURGXFHG µVXUSOXV LQFRPH¶ UHTXLUHPHQWV VR WKDW
individuals may be making payments for up to three years after they are discharged. Even in 
the US, the non-dischargeability of significant debts such as student loans and the use of re-
affirmation agreements mean that individuals may continue to repay debts notwithstanding the 
discharge.60 US legislators have historically demonstrated a preference for Chapter 13, the 
partial repayment alternative, as the primary remedy for consumer debtors at least since the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978, even if in practice this preference was frustrated by debtor choice 
DQG WKH UHDOLW\ RI GHEWRUV¶ FLUFXPVWDQFHV61 In the UK, government as well as insolvency 
professionals VKDUHDPDVWHUQDUUDWLYHRIµFDQSD\VKRXOGSD\¶. The major professional body, 
R3, is lobbying for an extension of the standard bankruptcy discharge period to three years, 
with a swift discharge reserved for the deserving poor under the Debt Relief Order (µDRO¶).62 
Straight bankruptcy is a suppressed political alternative63 for debtors in the UK.   
                                                     
60
 7KH866XSUHPH&RXUWQRWHGWKDWWKHDPHQGPHQWVZHUHEDVHGRQDQLGHRORJ\RIµFDQSD\VKRXOGSD\¶
See, Kagan J in Ransom v FIA Card Services, N. A 562 U.S. 61, 64 (US Supreme Court, 11 JanuDU\µ,Q
particular, Congress adopted the means test ² [t]he heart of [Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act 2005¶V@FRQVXPHUEDQNUXSWF\UHIRUPV«DQGWKHKRPHRIWKHVWDWXWRU\ODQJXDJHDWLVVXHKHUH² 
to help ensure that debtors who FDQSD\FUHGLWRUVGRSD\WKHP¶ 
61
 See, Ramsay, above n 16, ch 2. 
62




 In 2015, the UK Financial Conduct Authority found in research on debt management companies, that few 
individuals had knowledge of the different options, and conceptualised bankruptcy as an extreme and stigmatising 
option. Advisers RIWHQGRZQSOD\HGEDQNUXSWF\DVDQDOWHUQDWLYHUHPHG\7KH\RIWHQUHLQIRUFHGFXVWRPHUV¶LQLWLDO
reluctance to consider bankruptcy and played on misconceptions about it to deter them from this alternative. The 
)&$UHSRUWHGµPDQ\LQVWDQFHVZKHUHFXVWRPHUVZHre recommended very long-term debt management plans (often 
many decades...) when debt relief solutions are likely to have been more appropriate but adequate information 
DQGDGYLFH>ZHUH@QRWSURYLGHG¶)LQDQFLDO&RQGXFW$XWKRULW\µ4XDOLW\RI'HEW0DQDJHPHQW$GYLFH¶7KHPDWLF
Review TR15/8, June 2015) [4.55] <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/thematic-reviews/tr15-08.pdf>. In one 
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This emerging paradigm of the primacy of repayment plans assumes that such an approach is 
economically and socially beneficial and in Part III, below, I examine existing empirical studies 
on the effectiveness of existing personal insolvency systems in achieving a fresh start. As a 
preliminary, one characteristic is the increasing length of plans in common law jurisdictions. 
Thirty years ago, conventional wisdom was that a plan in excess of three years would often 
fail,64 but plans are now written for five years or more as in the case of the IVA.65 It is not clear 
whether this is economically or socially beneficial.66 Completion rates of repayment plans raise 
concerns,67 and the absence of any repayments by many debtors on plans in countries such as 
Sweden and Germany suggest the need for a swift discharge for many debtors. Constructing 
the NINA process as a residual programme does not seem to fit the reality of these systems 
where substantial numbers of debtors seem to have no repayment capacity. Braucher, surveying 
studies of repayment alternatives in North America, Australia and Europe in 2009 concluded 
WKDWH[LVWLQJGDWDZKLOHµVSRWW\¶ suggested that these alternatives had high costs in relation to 
GHEWUHSD\PHQWDQGµVLJQLILFDQWUDWHVRIIDLOXUHWRDFKLHYHDGLVFKDUJH¶68 Almost no knowledge 
existed on whether repayment plans were effective treatments for over-indebtedness or simply 
OHIWµPDQ\GHEWRUVVWUXJJOLQJILQDQFLDOO\DQGSHUKDSVLQRWKHUZD\VWRR¶.69 In many countries 
this question remains unanswered.  
 
III CONTEMPORARY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE µFRESH START¶ 
 
7KH µIUHVK VWDUW¶ LV D FHQWUDO REMHFWLYH RI SHUVRQDO LQVROYHQF\ law in many countries. The 
absence of significant assets in most individual bankruptcies undercuts the significance of the 
traditional bankruptcy objective of equitable distribution of assets among creditors. The World 
Bank outlines several objectives associated with the fresh start: encouraging 
entrepreneurialism; increased productivity; promoting financial and social inclusion; reducing 
health and welfare costs; encouraging responsible lending; and maximising economic 
activity.70 7KH(8&RPPLVVLRQLGHQWLILHVµUHGXFHGFRQVXPSWLRQODERXUDFWLYLW\DQG foregone 
growth opporWXQLWLHV¶ ZLWK RYHU-indebtedness, arguing that shorter discharge periods will 
                                                     
FDVHDGHEWDGYLVHUIDLOHGWRFRUUHFWDGHEWRU¶VPLVFRQFHSWLRQDERXWWKHHIIHFWVRIEDQNUXSWF\DQGUHFRPPHQGHG
a debt management plan lasting 125 years! Firms often had incentive structures for selling debt solutions.  
64
 The Cork Committee concluded in 1982 that the maximum duration of the proposed Debts Arrangement Order 
VKRXOGEHWKUHH\HDUVVLQFHµLWLVFOHDUIURPWKH-XGLFLDOstatistics relating to administration orders that debtors are 
unlikely to maintain the discipline of instalment payments over periods in excess of three years and we therefore 
UHFRPPHQGWKLVSHULRGDVWKHQRUP¶,QVROYHQF\/DZ5HYLHZ&RPPLWWHH8.&RUNCommittee), Insolvency 
Law and Practice: Report, Cmnd 8558 (1982) [313]. 
65
 See Insolvency Service, Individual Voluntary Arrangements Outcomes 1990±2015 (27 January 2017) 1 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/586485/IVA_Outcomes_2015_-
BZHESGI!QRWLQJWKDWRYHUµ% of IVAs registered in 2009 and 5% in 2008 were still ongoing, having started 
DURXQGRU\HDUVHDUOLHU¶,Q&DQDGDDUHFHQWVWXG\RIFRQVXPHUSURSRVDOVLQGLFDWHGDQDYHUDJHOHQJWKRI
years. This represents an increase from the norm of three years in the 1990s and early 2000s. See Vyacheslav 
0LNKHGDQG%DUU\6FKROQLFNµ&RQVXPHU3URSRVDOVLQ&DQDGDDIWHUWKH/HJLVODWLYH$PHQGPHQWVWRWKH%,$¶
(Research Paper, Office of Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Canada, 2015) 43 <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-
osb.nsf/eng/request.html?Open&id=90541C27F538E96485257F7F0060F37C&p=1>. 
66
 6HH -HDQ%UDXFKHU µ$ /DZ-in-Action Approach to Comparative Study of Repayment Forms of Consumer 
%DQNUXSWF\¶LQ1LHPL5DPVD\DQG:KLWIRUGDERYHQ%UDXFKHUVXJJHVWHGWKUHHFULWHULDIRUHYDOXDWLQJ
repayment systems: creditor repayment, debt relief, and treatment of debt problems. 
67
 Insolvency Service data in England and Wales indicate a failure rate of 30±40 per cent for IVAs: Insolvency 
Service, above n 65. Studies in the US have pointed to high failure rates for Chapter 13 plans. The study by 
Mikhed and Scholnick, above n 65, indicates a failure rate of 23 per cent in Canada. 
68




 Other benefits include proper account valuation, reducing wasteful collection costs, concentrating losses on 
more efficient and effective loss distributors. See World Bank, above n 52, [400] for summary. 
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permit consumers to re-HQWHUWKHµF\FOHRIFRQVXPSWLRQ¶71 Given these objectives, the task of 
research must be to determine whether existing systems achieve them. At the outset, it must be 
stated that this is a challenging research question. Bankrupts are a difficult group to study, and 
longitudinal data requires following individuals over a reasonable period of time. Moreover, in 
order to draw firm conclusions about the effect of personal insolvency law, one should ideally 
have a control group of similarly situated individuals who have not experienced insolvency.  
 
7KH86WUDGLWLRQRIWKHOLEHUDOµIUHVKVWDUW¶LVDQREYLRXVVLWH for testing the effectiveness of the 
fresh start. Several US studies question the efficacy of the existing fresh start under both 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. Porter and Thorne found that one year after bankruptcy filing, 25 
per cent of Chapter 7 bankrupts were struggling to pay routine bills and 33 per cent had a 
similar financial situation to that when they filed bankruptcy.72 They noted that the Brookings 
Institution had reached a similar conclusion in their study of bankrupts in the mid-1960s. A 
key factor differentiating those in continuing financial difficulties from other bankrupts was 
the absence of an adequate and steady income.73 A bankruptcy discharge did not solve this 
problem, because employers might not hire an individual who had filed for bankruptcy 
notwithstanding the prohibition in bankruptcy law on discrimination against bankrupts. Thus, 
although bankruptcy seemed to provide a fresh start for the majority of bankrupts, Porter and 
Thorne concluded that for others it was D µWHPSRUDU\ UHIXJH¶ IURP FRQWLQXLQJ LQFRPH
problems.74 
 
Other studies suggest that bankrupts may continue to suffer financially for a substantial period 
after bankruptcy. Zagorsky and Lupicka concluded on the basis of a comparative study of filers 
and non-ILOHUVWKDWIRUILOHUVLWµWRRNPDQ\\HDUVWRUHVWRUHILQDQFLDOZHOO-EHLQJ¶.75 Han and Li 
concluded that bankrupts have less access to unsecured credit such as credit cards after 
bankruptcy and were more likely than other consumers to use expensive credit sources. 
Although this high cost did reduce over time, filers were still more prone to face financial 
hardship ten years after filing.76 They concluded WKDW µIRUPDQ\EDQNUXSW KRXVHKROGV GHEW
discharge alone failed to provide a long-run improvement in tKHLU ILQDQFLDOKHDOWK¶.77 More 
recent research suggests that the seven and 10-year EDQNUXSWF\µIODJV¶RQDFUHGLWILOHKDGD
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 European Commission, above n 2, 4. 
72
 .DWKHULQH3RUWHUDQG'HERUDK7KRUQHµ7KH)DLOXUHRI%DQNUXSWF\¶V)UHVK6WDUW¶Cornell Law Review 
µ:HIRXQGWKDWMXVWRQH\HDUSRVW bankruptcy, one in four debtors was struggling to pay routine bills, and one 
in three debtors reported an overall financial situation similar to, or worse than, when that debtor filed bankruptcy. 
Our analysis of these data demonstrates that steady and sufficient income is the key to improved post-bankruptcy 
financial health. Factors that cause household income to decline, such as unemployment and underemployment, 
illness or injury, and old age, undermine the chances of financial recovery. These data reveal the limitations of 
bankruptcy as a social safety net and highlight the fragile economic situations of American families. We conclude 
WKDWEDQNUXSWF\LVDQLQFRPSOHWHWRROWRUHKDELOLWDWHWKRVHLQILQDQFLDOGLVWUHVV¶ 
73
 United States Bankruptcy Code, Protection Against Discriminatory Treatment, 11 USC § 525. 
74
 Ibid 70. 
75
 6HH/RLV5/XSLFDDQG-D\/=DJRUVN\µ$6WXG\RI&RQVXPHUV¶3RVW-discharge Finances: Struggle, Stasis or 
)UHVK6WDUW"¶American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 283. 
76
 6HH6RQJ+DQDQG*HQJ/Lµ+RXVHKROG%RUURZLQJDIWHU3HUVRQDO%DQNUXSWF\¶Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 6RQJ+DQDQG:HQOL/Lµ)UHVK6WDUWRU+HDG6WDUW"7KH(IIHFWVRI)LOLQJIRU3HUVRQDO
%DQNUXSWF\RQ:RUN(IIRUW¶Journal of Financial Services Research 123; Ethan Cohen-Cole, Burcu 
Duygan-Bump and Judit Montoriol-*DUULJD µ:KR *HWV &UHGLW DIWHU %DQNUXSWF\ DQG :K\" $Q ,QIRUPDWLRQ
&KDQQHO¶Journal of Banking and Finance 5101 (limited debt availability immediately after bankruptcy, 
but increased availability after 18 months). 
77
 Han and Li (2011), above n 76, 514. 
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substantial impact on credit availability, with increases in credit scores and credit balances after 
the flags were lifted.78 
 
It is often assumed that debtors do not obtain credit after bankruptcy because of the limits of 
available credit supply. Porter questions this conventional wisdom, citing studies which 
demonstrate that a significant credit market exists, targeting recently discharged bankrupts. She 
concludes that many debtors who have experienced bankruptcy do not borrow on credit cards 
because of the painful experience of bankruptcy.79 This undermines the fresh start objective of 
facilitating re-entry to the credit market. 
 
Empirical studies of Chapter 13, which permits an individual to cure arrears on a home 
mortgage and repay a portion of debts over three to five years have questioned its benefits. 
Studies document low completion rates (on average about one third of filers obtain a discharge) 
and a failure by many individuals to save their homes, which is often a reason for filing for 
Chapter 13.80 One recent study, using a logistic regression analysis of national data from the 
2007 Consumer Bankruptcy project, concludes that the majority of individuals do not complete 
plans under Chapter 13, that Chapter 13 does not act as a home-saving device, and generally 
GHOD\V UDWKHU WKDQ SUHYHQWV IRUHFORVXUH &KDSWHU  WKH DXWKRUV FRQFOXGH LV µSURIRXQGO\
LQHIILFLHQW¶.81 
 
These socio-legal studies contrast with an econometric study by Dobbie and Song,82 which 
followed the trajectory of individuals in Chapter 13 from 1992 to 2005 in terms of subsequent 
earnings, mortality rates, and home foreclosure. Using a randomised methodology,83 which 
allowed for the existence of a control group, the authors found that over the first five post-filing 
years those at the margin who were granted Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection were 
significantly better off financially in terms of income,84 and had a significantly lower mortality 
rate and home foreclosure rate than those denied bankruptcy protection. The difference 
between the groups is represented by the significant deterioration in those who did not obtain 
bankruptcy protection rather than gains by those granted protection. Those who filed 
successfully for Chapter 13 have similar pre- and post-filing earnings. Therefore, bankruptcy 
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 6HH:LOO'REELH HW DO µ%DG&UHGLW1R3UREOHP"&UHGLWDQG/DERXU0DUNHW&RQVHTXHQFHVRI%DG&UHGLW




American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 1. 
80
 SHH HJ 6XOOLYDQ :DUUHQ DQG :HVWEURRN DERYH Q   6FRWW ) 1RUEHUJ DQG $QGUHZ  9HONH\ µ'HEWRU
'LVFKDUJH DQG &UHGLWRU 5HSD\PHQW LQ &KDSWHU ¶   Creighton Law Review 473, 476; William C 
:KLWIRUGµ7KH,GHDORI,QGLYLGXDOL]HG-XVWLFH&RQVXPHUBankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer 
3URWHFWLRQ LQ&RQVXPHU%DQNUXSWF\¶  American Bankruptcy Law Journal 397, 411; studies cited in 
Braucher, above n 66, 335± DQG .DWKHULQH 3RUWHU µ7KH 3UHWHQG 6ROXWLRQ $Q (PSLULFDO 6WXG\ RI 'HEWRU
2XWFRPHV¶Texas Law Review %XWVHH+HQU\(+LOGHEUDQG,,,µ$5HVSRQVHWRD3UHWHQG6ROXWLRQ
(2011) 90 Texas Law Review 1, criticising the methodology which limited interviews to individuals who had failed 




Bankruptcy Outcomes (Legal Research Paper no 2016-46, University of California Irvine, 2016) 1. 
82
 :LOO'REELHDQG-DH6RQJµ'HEW5HOLHIDQG'HEWRU2XWFRPHV0HDVXULQJWKH(IIHFWVRI&RQVXPHU%DQNUXSWF\
3URWHFWLRQ¶American Economic Review 1272. 
83
 Bankruptcy filers are randomly assigned to judges who vary in their rates of granting bankruptcy protection. 
They were therefore able to investigate individuals at the margin who might randomly be confirmed or rejected. 
After discarding data relating to bankruptcy offices with a single judge and certain other factors which prevented 
UDQGRPDVVLJQPHQWWKHDXWKRUV¶GDWDUHSUHVHQWHGSHUFHQWRI&KILOLQJVGXULQJWKLVSHULRG 
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 Marginal recipient of Ch 13 earning $5 562 more than marginal dismissed filer. 
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appeared to mitigate the effects of a financial downturn for an individual preceding 
bankruptcy.85 The study also suggests that bankruptcy protection might increase incentives to 
continue to work, through its protection against wage garnishment.86 Economic stability might 
be promoted,87 because individuals do not have incentives to go underground, or move state to 
avoid wage garnishment, and are protected against immediate home foreclosure. The authors 
conclude that Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection provides significant benefits for debtors.88  
 
The contrast between the findings of this study and previous socio-legal studies is striking. 
Thus, although many individuals do not receive a discharge in Chapter 13, according to Dobbie 
and Song they have a better post-bankruptcy experience than those not granted protection. 
These US findings on Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 suggest that some debtors do benefit from 
these chapters, but for at least a minority of debtors the costs of bankruptcy may be high and it 
may not be addressing continuing problems of inadequate or insecure income.89 Sullivan, 
Warren and Westbrook also suggest that the stigma of bankruptcy may have increased over 
time as greater media publicity is given to filings and the importance of maintaining a good 
credit score. A potential bankrupt may now fear the cost to her or his credit reputation, in a 
similar manner to the historical fear of disapproval by RQH¶Vneighbours and community.90  
 
European studies of the longitudinal effects of personal insolvency relief are limited. No recent 
systematic studies exist in England and Wales, a jurisdiction which liberalised the bankruptcy 
discharge in 2002 by reducing the period from three years to one year. The English Insolvency 
Service evaluated the impact of this reform, concluding in 2007 that although a swift discharge 
did have immediate emotional benefits, bankrupts still faced difficulties in re-entering the 
financial market because there were no changes in lending and credit reference policies.91 The 
concept of stigma was associated by bankrupts with problems obtaining a bank account, being 
unable to repay creditors, and the effects on their credit rating.92 
 
The few empirical studies of continental European repayment plans are troubling. A qualitative 
longitudinal analysis of individuals on debt restructuring plans in Finland indicates that 
individuals continued to live at a low subsistence level one year after the payment plan had 
ended.93 A pilot study of individuals who had used the Swedish debt restructuring system 
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 µ>%@DQNUXSWF\SURWHFWLRQPLWLJDWHVWKHORQJ-term consequences of financial shocks that might otherwise harm 
GHEWRUVEXWGRHVQRWFRQIHUDQ\EHQHILWVLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDILQDQFLDOVKRFN¶'REELHDQG6RQJDERYHQ 
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 The authors tested this by analysing the effects in states with different wage garnishment laws. 
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 Tested through analysis of probability of individual working in the same industry, and on probability of worker 
in baseline county. 
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 Dobbie and Song, above n 82, 1274. 
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 Hacker, above n 11. 
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 6HH7HUHVD$6XOOLYDQ(OL]DEHWK:DUUHQDQG-D\:HVWEURRNµ/HVV6WLJPDRU0RUH)LQDQFLDO'LVWUHVV$Q
Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings (2006) 59 Stanford Law Review 213, 242; 
Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren TyDJLGHYHORSWKHWKHPHWKDWVWLJPDPD\KDYHLQFUHDVHG6HHµ7KH0\WK
RIWKH,PPRUDO'HEWRU¶LQ(OL]DEHWK:DUUHQDQG$PHOLD7\DJLThe Two Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Parents 
are Going Broke (Basic Books, 2003). 
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 See Insolvency Service, Enterprise Act 2002²the Personal Insolvency Provisions: Final Evaluation Report 
>@µ5HKDELOLWDWLRQRIEDQNUXSWVLVEHLQJVWLIOHGE\DODFNRIFKDQJHLQOHQGHUDQGFUHGLWUHIHUHQFHDJHQF\
policies, which, despite earlier discharge, will continue to deny bankrupts access to various types of financial 
SURGXFWV¶ 
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 Insolvency Service, Attitudes to Bankruptcy Revisited (2006). 
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 µ,Q)LQODQGRIWKRVHGHEWRUVZKRKDYHLPSOHPHQWHGDSD\PHQWSODQRYHU% described their subsistence as 
poor when asked 1 year after the pa\PHQWSODQKDGHQGHG¶6HH7XXOD/LQQDµ&RQVXPHU,QVROYHQF\7KH/LQNDJH
EHWZHHQ WKH )UHVK 6WDUW &ROOHFWLYH 3URFHHGLQJV DQG WKH $FFHVV WR 'HEW $GMXVWPHQW¶   Journal of 
Consumer Policy 357, 372. 
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during the period 2003 to 200894 found that 34 per cent did not think it had given them a fresh 
start,95 although a majority responded that debt relief had provided a solution to their financial 
problems. Finally, recent Australian research questions whether bankruptcy provides 
significant benefits for disadvantaged and low income, individuals since it fails to address the 
structural causes of financial hardship. Ali, 2¶%ULHQ DQG 5DPVD\ FRQFOXGH WKDW, while 
bankruptcy provides many benefits, they are unevenly distributed with µDFFHVV WR DGHTXDWH
LQFRPH¶SOaying a critical role in rehabilitation.96  
 
The promotion of entrepreneurialism is part of the personal insolvency paradigm but studying 
the effects of bankruptcy law on entrepreneurialism throws up the difficulty of identifying 
µHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶Entrepreneurialism is associated with innovation but studies often use self-
employment as a proxy. Self-employment is a category which may be over-inclusive as a proxy 
for innovation UDQJLQJ IURP LQGLYLGXDOV ZKR DUH µYHU\ VHOI-sufficient to extremely 
YXOQHUDEOH¶.97 It may include individuals who were formerly employed and are in precarious 
positions with low incomes and few social protections. A widely cited econometric study does 
indicate a correlation over time between the liberality of the bankruptcy discharge, and levels 
of self-employment.98 However, the study does not comment on the quality or innovative 
nature of the self-employment which is encouraged. Another study suggests no connection 
between insolvency and innovative entrepreneurship.99 The English Insolvency Service found 
no connection between the liberalised discharge procedures in 2002 and business start-ups 
(used as a proxy for entrepreneurialism).100 Moreover, while a more forgiving bankruptcy law 
may permit more marginal high-risk business activity it may also result in higher credit costs 
for all entrepreneurs,101 in terms of interest rates and collateral requirements. In the US, more 
homeowners in states with high homestead exemptions are likely to own a business, but may 
pay higher interest rates for credit. 
 
US bankruptcy law is the inspiration for European policy makers wishing to promote 
HQWUHSUHQHXULDOLVP WKURXJK EDQNUXSWF\ µ)DLO IDVW IDLO FKHDS DQG PRYH RQ¶ LV D PDQWUD
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 The Swedish restructuring system requires a five-year period of rehabilitation irrespective of ability to make 
any payment.  
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 See generally Richard Ahlstrom, S Edstrom and M Savemarkt, Is Debt Relief Rehabilitative? An Evaluation of 
'HEW5HOLHYHG3HUVRQV¶+HDOWK/LIH4XDOLW\DQG3HUVRQDO)LQDQFHV7KUHH Years After Conducted Debt Relief 
(The Swedish Consumer Agency, 2014). 
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 6HH 3DXO $OL /XFLQGD 2¶%ULHQ DQG ,DQ 5DPVD\ µ%DQNUXSWF\ DQG 'HEWRU 5HKDELOLWDWLRQ $Q $XVWUDOLDQ
(PSLULFDO6WXG\¶  Melbourne University Law Review 688, 725; Paul Ali, LucinGD2¶%ULHQ DQG ,DQ
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Australian Business Law Review 144. 
97
 0LHV:HVWHUYHOGµ7KH³1HZ´6HOI-(PSOR\HG$Q,VVXHIRU6RFLDO3ROLF\¶European Journal of 
Social Security UHIHUULQJWRWKHDQDO\VLVE\0DUWLQH'¶$PRXUVDQG6WHSKDQH&UHVSRµ7KH'LPHQVLRQVRI
Heterogeneity Among Own Account Self-EmplR\HG(OHPHQWVIRUD7\SRORJ\¶Industrial Relations 
459. See Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury, 2011). 
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 6HH-RKQ$UPRXUDQG'RXJODV-&XPPLQJµ%DQNUXSWF\DQG(QWUHSUHQHXUVKLS¶American Law and 
Economics Review 303. 
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 'DYLG 0 3ULPR DQG :P 6FRWW *UHHQ µ%DQNUXSWF\ /DZ DQG (QWUHSUHQHXUVKLS¶  Entrepreneurship 
Research Journal 1(2) <https://search-proquest-
com.ezp01.library.qut.edu.au/docview/1435441928?accountid=13380>. This study used two measures: self-
employment and different levels of venture capital within a state. The latter was intended to capture the 
µLQQRYDWLYH¶QDWXUHRIHQWUHSUHQHXULDOLVP 
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 See Insolvency Service, above n 91, 41±2 citing statistical analysis conducted by Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills. 
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 6HH $SDUQD 0DWKXU µ%H\RQG %DQNUXSWF\ 'RHV WKH 86 %DQNUXSWF\ &RGH 3URYLGH D )UHVK 6WDUW IRU
(QWUHSUHQHXUV"¶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associated with Silicon Valley but socio-legal study of bankrupt entrepreneurs in the US does 
QRWDOZD\VSURYLGHDQRSWLPLVWLFSLFWXUHRILQGLYLGXDOVµERXQFLQJEDFN¶LQEXVLQHVV102  Lawless 
notes the mythology in the US of the founders of Google who financed their business initially 
WKURXJKµDOORIRXUFUHGLWFDUGVDQGRXUIULHQGV¶FUHGLWFDUGVDQGRXUSDUHQWVFUHGLWFDUGV¶.103 
Bankruptcy law may aspire to facilitate this type of high-risk, high-reward business but 
Lawless FLWHV6KDQH¶VWH[WThe Illusions of Entrepreneurship104 which notes that most small 
businesses fail; only a few are established in high tech industries; and they contribute only a 
modest number of jobs. A more forgiving bankruptcy law for self-employed individuals is 
certainly justifiable for similar reasons to those applicable to consumers, but the evidence is 
not overwhelming on its promotion of entrepreneurialism.    
 
A Research on NINA Programmes 
 
Little systematic research exists on the success of schemes designed specifically to provide a 
swift fresh start for those with few assets or income. In England and Wales, women represent 
the majority of users of the Debt Relief Order µDRO¶. Many are sole parents and unemployed. 
They owe debts to central and local state creditors and public utilities, as well as private 
creditors.105 Reductions in income and increases in expense dominate the reasons for filing a 
DRO (Table 3).  
 







Increase in household expense 
 
11.9 
Living beyond means 
 
15.5 
















Source: Insolvency Service. 
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 Scott A Shane, The Illusions of Entrepreneurship (Yale University Press, 2008). 
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 An early survey by the Insolvency Service noted that the profile of debtors accessing the DRO system was 
SULPDULO\µORZLQFRPHSUHGRPLQDQWO\XQHPSOR\HGLQGLYLGXDOVZLWKDQDYerage of six creditors; over 53 per cent 
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A government review in 2014±15 did gather information from approved intermediaries and 
RWKHUVRQLWVRSHUDWLRQ7KHFRQVHQVXVZDVWKDWWKHµFXUUHQWV\VWHPLVZRUNLQJZHOO¶106 
Clients of intermediaries indicated that the DRO had improved their mental and physical 
health. The Order also had a positive impact on 50 per cent of debtors¶ relationships with 
their families.107 However, little evidence exists as to the economic and financial impact of 
the order. Sixty-one percent of debtors in a non-random online survey indicated that they had 
not wished to access credit after the DRO, with one commenting that the experience of the 
'52KDVµWDXJKWWKHPDOHVVRQDERXWERUURZLQJLQWKHIXWXUH¶108 An earlier pilot study of 
bankruptcy had also found that a significant portion of bankrupts communicated a reluctance 
to borrow in the future,109 and Porter identified the same theme in her 2010 US study.110 The 
DRO could not only EHSHUIRUPLQJDµUHVSRQVLELOLVLQJ¶ or disciplining function, but also 
undermining the objective of consumers re-entering the credit market. Further preliminary 
non-random research on social media suggests that individuals are often concerned about the 
effect of a DRO on their credit rating, with some regretting the effects it may have on their 
ability to obtain credit.111 Evaluation of the similar µNo Asset¶ procedure in New Zealand 
concluded that the benefits of the procedure, while significant, might be short term, 
addressing immediate debt problems but not more general budgeting skills among the debtors 
interviewed 112.  
 
These special means-tested procedures may increase access through reduced costs but their 
relatively stringent access controls suggest a continuing fear among policy makers about moral 
hazard and opportunism in insolvency. The Insolvency Service also has an interest in 
minimising its costs in administering NINA insolvencies. It devotes modest resources to the 
DRO and covers its costs through the user fee, with advice agencies (the approved 
intermediaries) bearing the majority of the costs of screening individuals.113  
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 See Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Insolvency Proceedings: Debt Relief Orders and the 
Bankruptcy Petition Limit²Call for Evidence; Analysis of Responses 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 See Ministry of Economic Development, Evaluation of the No-Asset Procedure: Final Report (2011) 3±4. One 
article suggests reforming the NAP in New Zealand to require mandatory participation by debtors in counselling. 
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Although not a study of bankrupts, a longitudinal qualitative study of low income individuals 
in England who had obtained debt advice in 2007 and 2011 provides intriguing results.114 This 
group would often meet the requirements for a DRO. At the end of the project in 2015 just over 
a WKLUGGHVFULEHGWKHPVHOYHVDVµGHEWIUHH¶,115 KDOIGHVFULEHGWKHPVHOYHVDVµPDQDJLQJ¶WKHLU
debt, and a small number saw little possibility of moving out of debt. Those who were debt 
free did so either through bankruptcy, inheritance or increased income with a very small 
proportion doing so through saving and cutting back. Seven participants became debt free 
through bankruptcy; four remained debt free at the end. The authors concluded that bankruptcy 
UHSUHVHQWHGµDEUHDWKLQJVSDFH¶IRUVRPHEXWIRURWKHUVZDVVLPSO\DµWHPSRUDU\UHVSLWHLQD
ORQJHUVWRU\RILQGHEWHGQHVV¶116 Bankruptcy was a temporary change in a long term experience 
of problems where income does not meet outgoings.117 The authors conclude that debt advice 
and financial literacy were of some value, but greater priority should be given to addressing 
structural problems of low wages, limited social security, and health issues. According to the 
DXWKRUVµZLOIXOQRQ-SD\PHQWDQGILQDQFLDOPLVPDQDJHPHQWDUHLQIDFWPLQRUFRQFHUQV¶IRU
those on low incomes.118 They also suggested that insufficient attention was currently given to 
understanding the trajectory of debt careers rather than merely providing a static picture of 
over-indebtedness and its causes.  
 
These preliminary findings suggest several reasons for further study of the NINA debtor. First, 
the DRO and similar procedures focus on a generally low-income group which may provide a 
challenge for the fresh start objective, since debtors may be suffering from continuing income 
problems. Studies in the UK indicate three different types of poverty: individuals who have a 
one-off transient experience of poverty; those experiencing recurring poverty and those in 
persistent poverty.119 7KHSRRUDUHµQRWDKRPRJHQRXVDQGHVVHQWLDOO\VWDWLFSRSXODWLRQ¶120 A 
DRO may therefore be effective for some groups, but is possibly unnecessary for those with a 
transient experience of poverty. Second, the majority of users of the English process are female 
and often sole parents. Social reproduction121 LQFRQWHPSRUDU\FDSLWDOLVPUHPDLQVZRPHQ¶V
work. If wages stagnate and social supports are reduced, social reproduction may depend on 
high cost credit. Study of the DRO provides a window onto this phenomenon, which could be 
linked to study of similarly situated households who have not used a DRO. Third, it provides 
                                                     
the primary reasons for the high levels of rejection are incomplete applications, debts higher than the statutory 
ceiling and objections by creditors. 
114
 *DE\$WILHOG5REHUW/LQGOH\DQG0LFKDHO2UWRQµ/LYLQJZLWK'HEW$IWHU$GYLFH$/RQJLWXGLQDO6WXG\RI
3HRSOHRQ/RZ,QFRPHV¶)ULHQGV3URYLGHQW)LIW\-nine participants were recruited in 2007 from not-
for-profit advisers Citizens Advice, National Debtline and three community-based advice providers. Fifty-three 
were recruited in 2011 from individuals with mortgage arrears, some of whom had sought advice.  
115
 ,ELGWKHDXWKRUVLQGLFDWHWKDWWKHLUGHILQLWLRQRIµGHEWIUHH¶PXVWEHTXDOLILHGµ6RPHSDUWLFLSDQWVGHVFULEHG
themselves as debt-free when they clearly were not entirely without debt, having overdrafts, credit cards and 
mortgages. Some also owed money to family members, but they had no debts for which they were being pursued 
E\FUHGLWRUV¶ 
116
 Ibid 31.  
117
 Ibid 9. 
118
 Ibid 66. 
119







of Capital and Care (2016) 100 New Left Review 99. 
Towards an International Paradigm of Personal Insolvency Law? A Critical View 
QUT Law Review 17 (1), October 2017 | 35 
 
an opportunity to study the intersection of private law regulation of debt, and housing and 




The following points arise from analysis of the empirical studies in this section. First, 
bankruptcy does seem to provide benefits for some individuals but not others. This might seem 
a trite observation but further research to identify relevant groups who may benefit would be 
useful. Further longitudinal studies are necessary of the trajectory of individuals into over-
indebtedness, the role of bankruptcy as an intervention in the process, and the subsequent 
experience of the debtor. Typologies of the debtor career may emerge from such studies. The 
Money Advice Service in the UK for example has attempted to outline different categories of 
the over-iQGHEWHG LQFOXGLQJ µVWUXJJOLQJ VWXGHQWV EHQHILWV GHSHQGHQW IDPLOLHV ZRUULHG
ZRUNLQJIDPLOLHVVWUHWFKHGIDPLOLHVORZZDJHIDPLOLHVDQGRSWLPLVWLF\RXQJZRUNHUV¶123 Debt 
relief might have different consequences for these groups. Debt advice agencies may already 
explicitly or implicitly tailor advice based on these typologies, but further research on the debt 
career of these distinct groups and the effects of bankruptcy on the career should be undertaken. 
Second, the extent of the benefit of the fresh start may depend on the practices of market actors 
such as banks124 and credit reference agencies. It is the rules of credit reporting systems, used 
by creditors, insurance companies, employers and landlords, rather than the law, which may 
determine the availability of services for individuals who have filed for bankruptcy.125 The 
English attempt to use the Bankruptcy Restriction Order signal as a warning for the market by 
separating culpable from innocent bankrupts seems to have had little effect on credit reporting 
systems.126 Third, bankruptcy as presently structured, may be a limited remedy for certain 
groups who suffer from continuing instability of employment, long term poverty or 
unemployment. It may represent a temporary relief but may need to be integrated with better 
social protections.127 It is not a substitute for such protections. Existing measures to alter 
bankrupts¶ behaviour through counselling are unlikely to be effective in addressing the 
problems faced by this group.128 The studies pose the research question of how personal 
insolvency law, a private law form of consumption insurance, fits with social insurance and 
welfare provision, which may differ between countries. Fourth, Howard, in an analysis of ideas 
associated with the fresh start, poses the question whether bankruptcy is expected to serve too 
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 A meta-analysis of studies of financial education concluded that financial education may have a role in 
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many masters.129 We might want to be more modest in our expectations of the fresh start. We 
should also recognise the challenges in measuring the relationships between the fresh start and 
achieving a variety of social and economic objectives. Finally, the gap between the promise 
and the reality of the fresh start as a safety net suggests the value of considering alternative, 
more radical analyses of personal insolvency law in contemporary capitalism. These might 
open up new approaches and research questions for personal insolvency law research. 
  
IV THE RADICAL CRITIQUE AND THE STUDY OF PERSONAL INSOLVENCY 
 
The rise in the significance of personal insolvency law is linked with the transformations in 
capitalism since the 1970s. These have resulted in a rise in inequality,130 stagnation of wages 
in several countries, DQGWKHJURZWKLQKRXVHKROGGHEW7KHGHFOLQHRIWKHµPDOHEUHDGZLQQHU¶
model of the household and the rise of the two-income household creates a hostage to fortune 
should one partner lost a job. Neoliberal policies reduced the power of labour and welfare 
entitlements and embraced consumerism and entrepreneurialism. This period of high 
globalisation since the 1980s has been one where the lower middle classes of the rich countries 
have been the largest losers,131 and studies suggest that this group is most likely to face issues 
of over-indebtedness and insolvency. 
 
Theorising about credit and debt increased exponentially after the Great Recession, often as 
part of analyses of contemporary capitalism and neoliberalism.132 Several writers have 
highlighted the role of household debt in maintaining consumer demand in the face of 
stagnating wages, but also in contributing to unsustainable housing bubbles.133 Crouch 
describes this phenomenon as µprivatized Keynesianism¶,134 which reconciles labour flexibility 
with the maintenance of consumer demand. Streeck, adopting crisis theories of capitalism 
developed by the Frankfurt School in the late 1960s, argues that capitalism faced a legitimation 
crisis, as capitalist states were increasingly unable to steer the economy effectively and make 
good on increased social expectations. One strategy to address this problem was the promotion 
of SULYDWHFRQVXPSWLRQILQDQFHGE\µODYLVKFUHGLWWRSULYDWHKRXVHKROGV¶WKHUHE\µEX\LQJWLPH 
for WKHH[LVWLQJVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFRUGHU¶.135 Discourse theorists influenced by Foucault have 
highlighted how individuals are increasingly encouraged to behave like responsible credit users 
ZKRµOHDUQ WR H[SORLW FUHGLWPDUNHWV DSSURSULDWHO\¶. Lazzarato argues in The Making of the 
Indebted Man136 WKDWLQFRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLHW\ZLWKIHZHUWUDGLWLRQDOµVLWHVRIGLVFLSOLQH¶, such 
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as the factory, a society of control now exists,137 where the creditor-debtor relationship has 
become more central to contemporary capitalism than the capital±labor relationship. The power 
to control and constrain debtors µdoes not come from outside, as in disciplinary societies, but 
from debtors themselveV¶.138 This shaping of individual subjectivity may be through 
government promotion of financial literacy, or technologies of credit scoring, with credit 
bureaux performing a sorting and disciplining role.139 Individuals are encouraged to check their 
credit score and improve their credit rating. They must learn to live with debt.140 Consumers 
are enlisted as regulatory subjects to make credit markets competitive (for example, through 
switching behaviouUDQGE\SROLFLQJµLQWHUQDOLWLHV¶VXFKDVLPSXOVLYHQHVVRUP\Rpia, which 
might result in over-indebtedness. This is the world of the responsible borrower.141   
 
The idea of debt as a disciplining force is not new. Calder argued that the rise of instalment 
debt in the US, which required individuals to adjust to the discipline of monthly payments, 
extended the discipline of the Fordist factory system to private consumption.142 He also 
documents the efforts of elite opinion makers to normalise and legitimise consumer debt, for 
example changing its description from µFRQVXPSWLYH¶ WR FRQVXPHU GHEW LQ WKH V 7KLV
conscious creation of a debt culture was supported both by labour and business interests in the 
US.143 
 
Marxist analyses link both material conditions and ideological factors to paint a picture of 
exploitative credit, where financial institutions have increasingly turned to value-extraction 
from consumers as a source of profit,144 legitimated by liberal credit narratives. Soederberg 
argues that capital exploits low income workers through the credit system, a form of secondary 
exploitation which fails to address the continuing problem of falling profits, low productivity 
and stagnant wages. The law structures and legitimates this exploitation through what she terms 
the Debtfare State as one component of the neoliberal state. A neo-liberal discourse of the 
µGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQRIFUHGLW¶ µILQDQFLDO LQFOXVLRQ¶, and µconsumer SURWHFWLRQ¶ OHJLWLPDWHV WKLV
exploitation. The democratisation of credit to poorer individuals substitutes for secure jobs; 
µILQDQFLDO LQFOXVLRQ¶ PDVNV WKH RIWHQ SRRU FUHGLW WHUPV ZKLFK PDQ\ ZRUNHUV REWDLQ; and 
consumer protection UHOLHVRQµindividualized market based protection rather than the welfare 
                                                     
137
 6HH*LOOHV'HOHX]Hµ3RVWVFULSWRQWKH6RFLHWLHVRI&RQWURO¶October 3. 7KLVLGHDRIµJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶
where individuals experience discipline and shaping at many sites ² the workplace, school ² is a characteristic 
of neo-OLEHUDOµJRYHUQLQJDWDGLVWDQFH¶ 
138
 Lazzarato, above n 136, 69. 
139
 6HH0DULRQ)RXUFDGHDQG.LHUDQ+HDO\µ&ODVVLILFDWLRQ6LWXDWLRQV/LIH&KDQFHVLQWKH1HROLEHUDO(UD2013) 
38 Accounting, Organizations and Society 559. 
140
 Lazzarato, above n 136µ/HDUQLQJKRZWR³OLYHZLWKGHEW´KDVQRZEHHQPDGHSDUWRIFHUWDLQ$PHULFDQ
VFKRROFXUULFXOD¶6HHDOVR ,DLQ5DPVD\ µ&RQVXPHU&UHGLW6RFLHW\DQG&RQVXmer Bankruptcy: Reflections on 
&UHGLW&DUGVDQG%DQNUXSWF\LQDQ,QIRUPDWLRQDO(FRQRP\¶LQ1LHPL5DPVD\DQG:KLWIRUGDERYHQ  
141
 Lazzarato, above n 136,QGLYLGXDOVµGHYHORSDZD\RIOLIHGLVFLSOLQHDWWLWXGHVDQGFRQGXFWDSSURSULDWH
to tKH³LQGHEWHGPDQ´>VLF@ZKRVKRXOGOHDUQWRH[SORLWFUHGLWPDUNHWVDSSURSULDWHO\¶ 
142
 See eg Lendol Calder, Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit (Princeton 
University Press, 2009). Calder drew on Jean Baudrillard: - %DXGULOODUG µ7KH &RQVXPHU 6RFLHW\¶ Selected 
Writings (Stanford University Press, 2001) 81. This point was also made by David Caplovitz in the 1970s: D 
&DSORYLW]µ7KH6RFLDO%HQHILWVDQG&RVWVRI&RQVXPHU&UHGLW¶LQ50*RRGHHGConsumer Credit (Leyden, 
1978). 
143
 This shift in the ideology of debt was part of a more general shift to consumerism in the US which was promoted 
by Ordoliberal writers such as Walter Lippman to reduce class conflict between capital and labour: James Q 
:KLWPDQµ&RQVXPHULVPYHUVXV3URGXFHULVP$6WXG\LQ&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ¶Yale Law Journal 340, 
361.  
144
 3DXOR / 'RV 6DQWRV µ2Q WKH &RQWHQW RI %DQNLQJ LQ &RQWHPSRUDU\ &DSLWDOLVP¶   Historical 
Materialism 180. 
QUT Law Review Volume 17 (1) ± Special Issue: Personal Insolvency ± A Fresh Start 
 
QUT Law Review 17 (1), October 2017 | 38 
 
VWDWH¶.145 Bankruptcy processes address the problems of higher level of default in this system 
through increased disciplining measures such as mandatory counselling, means testing, more 
repayment alternatives, and processes which delay the opportunity to declare bankruptcy. 
According to Soederberg, the US¶V Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act 2005 (µBAPCPA¶) represents WKHUDZSRZHURIFDSLWDOWRUHGXFHWKHVFRSHRIEDQNUXSWF\¶V
fresh start.146 Bankruptcy also legitimates the system by individualising failure and 
responsibility, neutralising collective responses to debt. The increased focus on repayment 
alternatives to straight bankruptcy reduces losses, forces responsibility onto consumers and 
suggests that straight debt forgiveness is a suppressed political alternative in contemporary 
society. Soederberg does not provide any reform proposals beyond those of guaranteeing a 
living wage and public provision for basic social needs.147 This radical critique is not 
fundamentally different from contemporary critiques of the US system by progressive scholars 
such as Katherine Porter, Jacob Hacker148 or Jay Westbrook. Progressives recognise the need 
to change income support and healthcare systems, but they probably assume, unlike 
Soederberg, that bankruptcy is a potentially useful institution which can be reformed to address 
the limits of the current system.   
 
Soederberg¶Vcritique overgeneralises and lacks attention to empirical and historical facts. For 
example, it is difficult to adopt her characterisation of the US Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978 as 
µEXUGHQVRPH¶WRGHEWRUV149 However, the radical approach may be useful for framing future 
research. It underlines the importance of discourse and narratives in shaping both social and 
individual understanding of debt, default and insolvency, and provides a potential grid for 
analysing existing findings. I outlined earlier the important role of insolvency statistics in 
shaping official narratives of failure. Further studies might explore the relationship of 
professional discourses of failure tRLQGLYLGXDOGHEWRUV¶QDUUDWLYHVDQGwhat debtors learn from 
the process, relating these findings WRVWXGLHVRILQGLYLGXDOV¶UHODWLRQVKLSWRODZDQGH[SHULHQFH
of the legal system.150 Such a study could provide an opportunity to understand the extent to 
whicK GHEWRUV µEX\ LQ¶ WR QHROLEHUDO QRUPV, identifying their problems in personal 
mismanagement rather than broader structural causes.151 Addressing this question may be best 
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achieved through rich qualitative research. Although much has been written at a high 
theoretical level about the shaping of individual subjectivity in neoliberalism, empirical 
investigation of the success of such shaping is limited.152 Law and society scholarship suggests 
that individuals are not passive recipients of law but may resist or reinterpret laws. 
Understanding how different individuals approach the insolvency process and its aftermath 
might increase our knowledge of how individuals think about the legal process and the role of 




This article sketched an emerging paradigm of personal insolvency with partial repayment 
alternatives as a preferred policy instrument, combined with residual immediate relief for the 
deserving poor. The paper documented concerns about the economic and social benefits of 
repayment alternatives, and the possible limits of insolvency law in addressing the problems 
of NINA debtors, while pointing to the need for further research. The growth of longitudinal 
research on the extent to which individuals receive a fresh start suggests that, while bankruptcy 
may benefit some groups, for others it is merely a way-station in a continuing battle with 
problems of debt and unstable income. Moreover, the connection between a liberal discharge 
procedure and the promotion of entrepreneurialism, a dominant international driver of reforms, 
deserves further examination.  
 
The mixed findings of existing research on the effectiveness of the fresh start suggest the need 
for more evidence-based policy and greater focus on the role of credit reference systems in 
determining the success of the fresh start. The current wave of empirical research raises 
questions whether bankruptcy is a progressive institution and what its role should be within 
social welfare systems, whether it dampens pressures for social welfare reform, or acts as a 
useful signal of the need for reform. The radical critique of bankruptcy as a legitimating and 
disciplinary institution in contemporary capitalism merits a scholarly response. It also has the 
methodological message that qualitative analysis of the discourse of bankruptcy and the 
experience of bankrupts may increase knowledge of the extent to which bankruptcy is a 
progressive or disciplinary institution. The introduction of special procedures in several 
countries to provide debt relief for low income individuals provides the opportunity to test the 
possibilities and limits of the fresh start precisely for those who may fall into the category of a 
µVXUSOXVSRSXODWLRQ¶ ² marginalised and low-income workers. 
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